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Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations:
EVOLVING TECHNIQUES FOR COOPERATION AMONG
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES*
W. Peter Cooke

MR. MUNDHEIM: We have heard that some of the problems between the host and the home country could be smoothed out by international cooperation. Peter Cooke has been one of the leaders in the

effort to develop international cooperation among supervisory agencies. Peter, would you talk a little bit about that approach to the
problem?
MR. COOKE: Thank you,Bob. Those of you who just heard Neal
Petersen and Alain Hirsch's remarks will realize how difficult it
is to foster this international cooperation.
I would like to spend a few minutes talking about the international framework of supervisory cooperation within which the debate about Y-7, and its relation to the operation and supervision of
foreign bank branches and affiliates in the U.S. and U.S. branches

and affiliates abroad, is being conducted.
1. RECONCILING DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS
First of all, an obvious remark. You cannot regulate internationally unless you have a governing international law. You can
only supervise. International supervisory techniques and agreements
on common approaches only become legally based when they are incorporated within different national systems on a consistent basis.
This problem of reconciling different legal systems, different
regulatory approaches, will pervade my remarks.
A.

Domestic Supervision

I want to begin by reminding you of the environment in which
international supervision developed. Supervisors are domestic
animals, or they certainly were until the 1970s. Then, all of a
sudden, spurred on by events like the failures of Herstatt Bank and
the Franklin National, supervisors came to a rather salutory perception of the degree to which banking had become internationalized and
the degree, therefore, to which supervisory techniques and procedures should also be internationalized.
They realized that there was a supervisory vacuum in the
global marketplace and that it needed to be filled. Filling this

*

Mr. Cooke's remarks were based on a more detailed paper, Developments in Cooperation Among Bank Supervisory Authorities. That
paper is reproduced in the Appendix to this chapter.
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vacuum involved two steps: first, the adaptation of essentially
domestic supervisory systems to the international marketplace, and
second, the need for cooperation among the domestic authorities.
There are two ways in which this cooperative effort can be pursued
and they can be characterized very clearly, I think, in the work of
two groups which are the most active in this field.
B.

Steps Toward Global Supervision

The first, and the first in time, was a group which was set
up among the supervisory bodies of the European Community. It was
called the Groupe de Contact, and it set out to meet on an informal

basis to discuss supervisory problems within the European Community.
It later developed a parallel role, undertaking technical studies
for formally constituted bodies within the European Community. The
ultimate objectives of the Community are directed towards the harmonization of banking legislation in the affected countries. That
particular route is one which seeks to produce, by way of Europeanbased legislation, a convergence of national laws and practices to
produce a common system within which banks can operate across national boundaries within the European Community.
The second approach--perforce a more informal approach--is
that which is followed by the supervisors of the main industrialized
countries meeting in Basle. It is essentially one of informal cooperation. It provides a forum for the formulation of guidelines
for international supervision, for personal contacts between supervisors, and for mutual education about each other's systems. Most
important, it ensures that at least among the major countries, and
I hope more widely as the message is spread, there will be no significant gaps in international supervisory arrangements. This
group does not seek to promote harmonization of law or regulation,
although it may be--and I would certainly hope that this would
happen--that some element of convergence of practice in different
countries will come about through a developing perception of each
country's best practice.
2. THE BASLE CO1MITTEE OF SUPERVISORS
I want to focus my remarks this afternoon on the work of the
Basle Committee of Supervisors. What is that committee trying to
do? We are trying to exercise an appropriate measure of control
over the international banking system. That system needs to be
allowed to work so that it can fulfill its function of financing
international trade. Although the system must be given scope to
develop, it must develop in an orderly manner. A delicate balance
must be struck between maintenance of national interests and the
freedom of the international marketplace. The real problem with
supervising the international business of banks is that if they are
supervised too rigidly the banks can just walk away and do their
business somewhere else where the supervision will be much less
stringent. Hence, the growth of the offshore center, as it is sometimes known, which permits the banking system to escape the fiscal
and monetary control regulations of national authorities. Indeed,
the growth of the Euro-currency markets in the first instance derived from measures taken by the U.S. authorities for domestic
reasons. So, there is a delicate balance here to be maintained.
There are two main strands of the work which is being pursued
and the understandings which are being sought internationally. The
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first is what has come to be known as the Concordat. This name is
somewhat obscure. It relates, if my history does not desert me, to
certain activities of the medieval papacy--which is perhaps not an
unreasonable antecedent for modern day banking supervisors.
A.

The Concordat

The principle of the Concordat was developed in the very early
days of international supervisory cooperation, in the mid-1970s, because there were no established practices relating to the overlapping
responsibilities of different national supervisors where banks were
conducting business across national boundaries. It sets out guidelines covering the responsibilities of different supervisory authorities for the ongoing supervision of banks where those banks operate
in more than one national jurisdiction. It is not, and it was never
intended to be, an agreement for the provision of lender-of-lastresort facilities to the international banking system. There should
not be any automatic link between acceptance of responsibility for
ongoing supervision and the assumption of a lender-of-last-resort
role.
The aim of the Concordat, then, is to sustain, as far as
possible, the health and safety of the existing structure. It does
not set out to rule on the way in which the pieces of that structure should be picked up if it is broken. The Concordat encompasses
the following principal guidelines and recommendations:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be
the joint responsibility of host and parent authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision,
each country should ensure that foreign banking establishments
are supervised, and supervision should be adequate as judged by
both host and parent authorities.
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host authorities since foreign establishments generally
have to conform to local practices for their liquidity management
and must comply with local regulations.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be
essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case of
subsidiaries, while primary responsibility lies with the host
authority, parent authorities should take account of the exposure
of their domestic banks' moral commitment in this regard.
(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of
information between host and parent authorities and by the granting
of permission for inspections by or on behalf of parent authorities
on the territory of the host authority. Every effort should be
made to remove any legal restraints (particularly in the field of
professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which might hinder
these forms of cooperation.
I have gone into some detail on this agreement because it is
the cornerstone of all international supervisory cooperation which
has been developed since that time. Indeed, it has recently been
reexamined and found to be still an adequate statement of the basic
approach towards international supervisory cooperation.
Just in passing, I might say that the Concordat has an implication for the operation of the Y-7 Report and associated forms. I
have a great deal of sympathy with what Alain Hirsch has said. At
the same time, because I try to sit in a position which enables me
to see the best sides of everybody's arguments, I also understand
the U.S. domestic problems. What is really crucial is that there be
[2461
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no infringement by the U.S. authorities of the principles of the
Concordat. Thus, the U.S. authorities must recognize--and I think
they do--that parental responsibility operates across national frontiers.
On one point, I very much agree with Alain. I too am not
sure what the U.S. authorities will do with the information they are
seeking from their reports. It certainly would be highly undesirable, in terms of developing and sustaining international cooperation, if every country were to adopt the same procedures as the U.S.
I might comment that the objections to the Americans' original proposals which have been expressed by most other major countries might
be thought to ensure that those countries would not have the presumption to impose similar procedures, as doing so would only fly in
the face of the case they are presently putting to the U.S. authorities. However, before dwelling too long on an abstract debate, I
personally feel that the important thing is to see how the matter
resolves itself in practice. Often things work out better than one
might imagine and I think we should wait and see how it does work out.
B. The Principle of Consolidation
The second major element in the development of supervisory
cooperation relates to what I have described as the principle of
consolidation, touched on earlier by Alain. That is, the principle
that there should be a capacity for the parent's supervisor to understand the totality of a bank's international business, in order
to get a proper picture of that institution's overall exposure to
risk and its capital adequacy. The consolidation principle is currently being implemented to varying degrees in different countries.
The principle has been accepted by all the major countries and has
obvious implications for the way in which supervisory responsibilities are carried out in practice.
3.

SHARING INFOIATION

In my paper I discuss a number of other aspects of international supervisory cooperation [1]. For the moment, I want to underscore just two aspects; they both relate to information flows.
There are two basic problems. One concerns consistency of data.
This is a real headache and will continue to be so, but is an
area where everybody is going to have to work very hard to improve
consistency. Data gathered by national banking systems for their
own national purposes do not generate an adequate basis for producing data on the worldwide activities of most of the major three
hundred banks of the world. Harmonizing data procedures and data
gathering arrangements is extremely difficult. This is also very
costly to the banks and they do not like it very much. I keep telling commercial bankers that I think they should regard harmonization
of this sort as very much in their own interests. They should be
prepared to produce additional data when it is required, in order to
serve their own wider interests by having global information available. Such information will be useful in their own businesses.
The second aspect relates to bank secrecy. A great deal has
been said about this subject. Personally, I do not believe that
banking secrecy provisions in different countries are an overwhelming obstacle to cooperation among supervisory authorities. It is
mostly on the deposit side, the liability side of the balance sheet,
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that the real sensitivity lies. Certainly Alain would agree that
this is the case in Switzerland, which is perhaps the arch priest
of banking secrecy.
It is important, of course, to know about concentration of
deposits, but it is really very much more important to know about
the spread of the risks on the assets side of the balance sheet.
The major industrialized countries, which include most of the major
banks of the world, have looked at this subject in a detailed way
over the last year or two. They have concluded that while it cannot
be denied that there are problems, these problems are manageable in
terms of the broad objectives of international supervisory cooperation. You can get the data that you need in order to consolidate
and to understand the extent of the exposure of different banks
around the world. Insofar as verification procedures are concerned,
if direct examination of overseas branches or subsidiaries by the
parent is not feasible or permitted, it can be handled by agreements
authorizing the host country supervisor to act as the agent of the
parent country supervisor, or through the external audit route.
I understand Neal Petersen's reservations about these routes, but
in the real world, in international terms, you must accept the techniques available. I would think that most of us would feel that the
external audit route for verification of data is generally a pretty
acceptable one.
Now, all this cooperation I have been talking about has been
in the context of the committee which meets at the BIS in Basle.
We are working to develop wider cooperation across the whole world.
You cannot, of course, operate a committee with a hundred or so
countries, so we have just twelve. We do have gatherings where
these agreements and understandings can be disseminated more widely.
The federal agencies in the U.S. are organizing a conference in
September 1981, in which supervisors from all around the world will
meet to discuss all these problems. This conference follows one
which we had in London in 1979. In the interim between these conferences, we disseminate within the supervisory fraternity the material we produce in Basle.
4.

FUTURE TRENDS

To conclude very briefly, I think that the important thing to
realize about international supervisory cooperation is that the international banking system is here to stay. International banking
is not going to go away. There is an enormous mass of international
business and no matter what changes are made in national bank regulations, the international banking system is not going to disappear,
and certainly could not without a great deal of effort on the part of
national authorities over a very long period of time. The growth of
international banking has been accompanied by evolution of international banking supervision. I think that the basis of good cooperative work has been well established and should have significant impact on the capacity of the supervisory authority in host and parent
countries to reconcile the kinds of problems which surfaced a little
bit, peeked out from under the carpet, shall we say, in Neal Petersen's and Alain Hirsch's comments.
The number of countries to which this international cooperation is going to be significant is increasing all the time, because
more and more banks in more and more countries are coming to have an
international dimension to their business. I think the system has
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enormous resilience to withstand shocks and difficulties which may
occur. Good supervision all around the world is absolutely essential to maintaining that resilience.
I would like to close by echoing a remark which Bob Mundheim
made at the beginning. As the system changes, supervisors have to
change with it. Structurally we will see, at least in the international sphere, the closer integration of banking, investment banking,
and other aspects of the international securities business. Consequently, the regulation of the banking and securities businesses may
also have to be more closely integrated in order to respond not only
to the internationalization of the two lines of business, but also
to the increasing intertwining of the two.
I would not wish to leave you with the impression that I am
over-confident about the capacity of the system to meet all the
strains to which it may be subject, but I think it is very much
better able to do so than it was a decade ago. I have a little
notice on my desk which is a quotation from Benjamin Disraeli, an
old nineteenth century prime minister in my country. It reads,
"Confidence is suspicion asleep." And so I always wish to be on the
guard against being over-confident about the capacity of the system
to sustain strain. As my Governor put it in a recent speech, "The
trouble with good health is that it is such a precarious state. It
can only get worse."
5.

REMAINING PROBLEMS
MR. MUNDHEIM:

Fritz, did you have a comment?

MR. KUBLER: well, there is not much I can add. Before coming
here I asked our supervisory authorities in Berlin about their feelings about the present situation. I must say, everything they said
confirms what Peter Cooke has told us right now. The system works
very well inside Europe, and existing gaps are going to be filled.
Germany is aiming at legislation for consolidation. Even at the
present moment, German banks, under a sort of gentlemen's agreement
with the authorities, come forward on a voluntary basis with information concerning their Luxembourg subsidiaries. So, I would like to
raise only two questions.
After having listened to the dispute between Neal and Alain,
my impression is that there remains a problem in Europe. The system
works well when the countries involved have about the same level of
supervision. But what are we going to do with the countries that
are not yet at this level--and perhaps will not be for the next decade or decades? I am sure that we are in almost the same situation
as the U.S. We just cannot completely prevent them from doing banking in Western Europe.
The second question to which I would like to return is the
problem of secrecy. Looking at some of the more recent American
legislation--for instance, at the financial privacy act you have
adopted [2]--the question arises, shouldn't Europe go a little bit
the same way? Of course, it cannot be overlooked that the German
supervisory authority is part of the Department of Treasury. This
certainly does not mean that all information they receive will go to
the Internal Revenue Service. But still, wouldn't it benefit international cooperation in banking supervision if a clearly defined
line could be drawn? Legislation could be enacted to specify where
information may go and where it has to be withheld. I would be very
[249 1

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/6

W.P. Cooke / Techniquesfor cooperation amongsupervisory auihorliies

happy to get reactions to this question from the supervisors on the
panel.
MR. MUNDHEIM:
MR. HIRSCH:

Neal or Alain, do you want to respond to that?
The second question is the easy one, I think.

We are moving toward legislation establishing the limits on the distribution of information given to a banking supervisory body, especially in the Common Market. The new Common Market text restricts
the use of information given by one authority to another authority.
Basically, information may be used only for supervision of banking
and for nothing else. The only small problem is how to deal with a

criminal offense. In some countries the notion of criminal offense
is very much broader today than it was in the past. It can mean even
a very, very minor offense. So, there are still some problems, but
I think on the whole, we are in the clear.
Your first question is the more difficult one. What if a
bank coming from a country where the supervisory organization is
still weak wants to do business in Europe? I think we should then
say, "If you are not internationally supervised in the proper way,
then we will look with a very, very close eye to see if you may have,
for instance, an independent subsidiary in Switzerland or in Germany."
An economically independent subsidiary should not be part of an international group or community which is not properly supervised.
In practice, that would mean applying some version of your Form Y-8f
but probably even tougher. It seems to me that there is no alternative to this, even if it is difficult to implement it.
MR. COOKE: May I add a comment on those two points? On the
question of the countries with less supervision, this is, of course,
a vexatious problem. It raises the problem which Neal referred to
of discrimination between one kind of national supervisory system
and another. This may be, on occasion, very difficult to do.
In our Banking Act of 1979, which is the basis for our present
supervisory arrangements, there is a specific provision which requires us to have regard for and be in contact with the supervisory

authority of the parent entity of any foreign banking institution
which wishes to set up a branch or a subsidiary in the United Kingdom. It is within our powers either to accept or not to accept the
adequacy of that supervision as fulfilling a number of the requirements that we otherwise would have to address ourselves. If we do
not accept it, then we have the difficult problem which Neal referred
to of having to appear to be discriminating against that country by
saying that we do not think much of its supervision and, therefore,
have to do the job ourselves. That is a difficulty, but at least
the problem is recognized in our legislation and we have a handle to
grasp in that regard.
On the general subject of the development of international
banks around the world from less supervised or unsupervised centers,
I think I should say that the major countries are all very clearly
agreed on what is the desirable principle here, that you should not
allow an entity from an unsupervised center to develop an international business. That is easier said than done. There are countries
that have in the last year or two passed legislation authorizing the
creation of fiew banks within territories that are specifically excluded from that country's supervisory regime. Banks that take advantage of this legislation may be consortium banks with entirely
respectable parentage,interested in pursuing international business
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from a tax and supervisory haven within a country. But in principle,
we are very unhappy about the proliferation of such entities around
the world and do our best to stop them from operating worldwide from
an unsupervised base. I am sympathetic on the whole to the view
that banks should not be allowed to enter a country if the host
country bank supervisory authority has forbidden it and where it
believes there is no supervision or the quality of supervision of
the parent is unsatisfactory.
On secrecy, the second point, I think the particular sensitivities relate to deposits. The other sensitivities of most European
countries relate to hidden reserves. This is a subject that is going
to be debated fairly hotly in Europe over the next year or two because, as Alain indicated, there is a bank-accounts directive now
before the European Community which seeks to settle the basis on
which hidden reserves can be maintained. This problem will likely be
with us for a long time.
The important point about secrecy is that it should not preclude supervisory authorities from communicating information which
is in their possession to other supervisory authorities when this is
in the interest of international banking supervision, that is, when
it is in the interest of banks generally operating in the countries
of the different supervisory authorities among whom this information
is being exchanged. I would very much hope that that principle of
free exchange of information for this purpose can be enshrined in
national laws as it is enshrined in the new United Kingdom legislation [3].
MR. MUNDHEIM:

I promised to let Fred Heldring ask a question.

MR. HELDRING: Peter, I was one of those who read your text
in hushed silence up in my room this morning. One of the sentences
in your report raises a question in my mind. The aim of the Concordat is to sustain, as far as possible, by effective supervision the
health and safety of the existing structure; and I am very impressed
with all the progress that has been made in that respect. Then you
go on to say that the Concordat does not set out to rule on the way
in which the pieces of the structure should be picked up if it is
broken.
May I ask your opinion about whatever infrastructure is being
built upon a similar basis of international cooperation to take care
of a breakdown in the structure at one place or another? Do you
think there is as much progress in that area as in supervision?
MR. COOKE: You are opening up a very big question which perhaps goes a little bit beyond the scope of today's discussion, although it is obviously very closely related to the ongoing supervisory process. I think that the lender-of-last-resort function in
terms of international business is an immensely complex one. I, for
one, believe it is important that it should not be made too specific.
There is a principle of moral hazard which we should observe in the
international banking system. The Governors of the major central
banks of the world issued a communique on September 10, 1974, at the
most troubled time in international markets, in which they said
rather delphically that means were available to deal with any problems that might arise, and I think we should leave it at that.
MR. MUNDHEIM:

Alec, you wished to make a brief comment?
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MR. VAGLIANO: Very brief. As an American bank we are, of
course, accustomed to a large amount of disclosure; and when it does
not affect customers' confidentiality, we are quite inured to that.
However, one point that came up today is the possibility that the
regulatory authorities in the many jurisdictions in which we do
business may move to global supervision, that is supervision of our
overall global activities. I would be very concerned that this
could eventually lead to inconsistencies and even conflicts where
we would be right in the middle. So I would, in that context, support cooperation between the supervisory authorities.

NOTES
[1]

See 58 to 63 infra.

[21

12 U.S.C. §§3401-3422 (Supp. I1 1979).

[3)

See Banking Act, 1979, C.37, §§19, 20.
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APPENDIX

IV
DEVELOPMENTS IN CO-OPERATION AMONG
BANKING SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES
W. Peter Cooke

INTRODUCTION
International co-operation among banking supervisory authorities is a
relatively new phenomenon. It emerged in the 1970's alongside the burgeoning
international banking activity which had developed significantly in the 1960's
and has continued to grow apace thereafter. I will review the growth in cooperation which has taken place during recent years from the particular perspective of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices which
has provided a focal point for that co-operation.
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY CO-OPERATION
The internationalization of banking brought about considerable changes
in banking systems and in the conduct of banking business. New international
markets grew up with their own techniques and conventions and new kinds of risks.
The number of international financial institutions grew considerably as banks
expanded across national frontiers through the establishment of subsidiaries and
branches in many countries to service the needs of their customers--large and
small--on an increasingly international basis and to take advantage of the newly
created markets. New types of bank were formed, particularly the so-called consortium banks with shareholders from many different countries. New financial
centres developed--notably those which are broadly categorized as "offshore"
centres--where banks were attracted by favourable fiscal and regulatory environments to conduct a significant part of their international operations. The
proliferation of new banks operating across national borders sometimes led to a
situation in which foreign branches and subsidiaries of banks in one country
operating in the markets of another country fell outside the perceived responsibilities of the supervisory authorities in either country. More generally, the
high degree of cross border interbank borrowing and lending through the evergrowing activity ofthe Euro-markets meant that banks became increasingly dependent for much of their liquidity on banks in other countries and on currencies
other than those of their country of origin.
Looking back, it is now clear that at the beginning of the 1970's the
perceptions and techniques of banking supervisory authorities around the world
had not kept pace with these developments. There was in effect a supervisory
vacuum in this new global market which needed to be filled. Neither the supervisors, nor indeed the banks themselves, had fully appreciated the degree to
which the banking environment was changing in character and the new increased
risks involved in international business. Supervisors were still very much
domestically oriented within the framework of different national banking systems.
Indeed it is difficult now to realize how little contact there was at that time
between those responsible for banking supervision in major countries.
MOVES TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY CO-OPERATION
The banking environment to which supervisors needed to respond was thus
changing radically--particularly in those countries where the world's major banks
were situated. The events of 1973 and 1974, when a number of banks in different
countries failed (notably the Herstatt Bank in 1974) and others experienced serious
losses, highlighted this changed environment and precipitated more urgent action.
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In response to these events, the Governors of the world's major central
banks took action to allay the concerns about the viability of the international
financial system. They issued a statement in September 1974 to the effect that,
while it was not practical to lay down in advance detailed rules and procedures
for the provision of temporary support to banks experiencing liquidity difficul-

ties, the means were available for that purpose and would be used if and when
necessary. At the same time the Governors concluded that a better co-ordination
of the surveillance exercised by national authorities over the international banking system was necessary and to that end they created a new standing committee-the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices with members drawn
from the Group-10 major industrialized countries and Switzerland.*
The first formative steps to bring together supervisors in major banking
countries had in fact been taken two years earlier in 1972 when, at the time of
the impending UK membership of the European Community, an informal and autonomous
group of those with operational responsibilities for banking supervision in EEC
countries was set up. Known as the Groupe de Contact its principal aim was, and
is, to achieve closer understanding and practical co-operation between the banking
supervisory authorities of the Member States. In recent years the Group has also
taken on a technical role for the Advisory Committee for Banking Co-ordination
(set up under the First Banking Directive of the European Community to advise the
European Commission on moves to harmonize the banking systems of the Community
and their regulation).
The Basle Committee of Supervisors met for the first time in February 1975.
Its first Chairman was Mr. George Blunden of the Bank of England; and I succeeded
him in 1977. The Committee has met regularly over the past six years--normally
three times a year.
There were two major tasks confronting banking supervisors which became
apparent to the Committee. The first was the need to adapt the national supervisory system within each country in order to cope with the wider dimensions of
their major banks' businesses. The second and complementary task was the promotion of close co-operation between national authorities in monitoring the activities of the overseas branches, subsidiaries and affiliates of their own banks and
the offshoots of foreign banks in their own territories. The Committee has provided a forum over the years in which supervisors can learn of each other's techniques and experience and hear of problems that may be emerging in different
national systems and could be of wider concern. It has been particularly valuable
in establishing close personal contacts between supervisors in different countries
--relationships which in a number of cases have facilitated rapid and effective
co-operation between the authorities concerned when banks operating within their
respective jurisdictions have experienced problems. More generally, the Committee
has worked to develop broad principles with which different national supervisory
authorities can be encouraged to conform in settling their own detailed arrangements. It is not, however, a forum which specifically sets out to harmonize banking supervisory arrangements. National systems have grown up with different
traditions: some with detailed statutory arrangements, others with more informal
and flexible supervisory frameworks; some have comprehensive examination procedures, others do not. In practice, however, members of the Committee have found
much to learn from each other and this mutual learning process may well over time
produce some convergence between national systems which can only be beneficial.
In all member countries the past few years have been a period of considerable
activity in the field of banking law and regulation. Most have enacted or are

* Committee members come from Belgium (and Luxembourg), Canada, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States.
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preparing major legislation and in every case this legislation reflects, albeit

to varying degrees, accords which have been reached in Basle or the incorporation
in the national laws of one country desirable features of the arrangements prevailing in others.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASLE COMMITTEE'S WORK
In the first period of the Basle Committee's work it concentrated on carving out first principles for international supervisory co-operation. They had to
be built up from virtually nothing. The first priority was to reach an understanding of the appropriate division of responsibility between national authorities
for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments with the object of ensuring
that no foreign banking establishment escaped supervision. The general statement
of the Committee's views on this subject which was subsequently endorsed by the
Governors in December 1975, has become known as the Concordat. I will discuss
this in more detail later. The importance of this early agreement cannot be emphasized too much. It represented the first, and a most significant, co-operative
step forward, and even if it may have been a step made easier by the pressure of
events at the time, it was nonetheless a considerable achievement which laid the
foundation for later co-operative efforts. Another matter to which the Committee
turned its attention at the outset was how an early warning system of potential
problems in national banking systems might be organized. It was concluded that
such problems could not in practice be handled through a separate monitoring system operated by an international body. Because of differences in national systems and legislation co-ordination would be difficult and would anyway tend to
duplicate national arrangements. Action to counter potentially dangerous situations should thus be taken by the national supervisory authority most concerned
in consultation with other countries as appropriate.
As the disturbances to the system lessened and immediate concerns were
allayed the Committee settled down to examine the supervisory tools and arrangements that would be necessary to facilitate implementation of the basic guidelines enshrined in the Concordat and to develop co-operation further. A major
recommendation was the use of supervision on a consolidated basis whereby the
capital adequacy and risk exposure of international banks would be monitored on
the basis of their worldwide business. The Committee also began to look beyond
the specific type of risk which had underlain the Herstatt crisis (foreign exchange risk) to a detailed examination of other types of risk facing international
banks--especially the degree of maturity transformation effected by individual
banks and the system as a whole--and the problems of measuring and monitoring
country risk.

As the Committee's work progressed substantial efforts were made to involve in the discussion process supervisors from a wider group of countries than
those represented on the Committee since it was realized that to be effective,
the supervision of international banking activity should be as comprehensive as
possible. From the outset a number of the Committee's papers had been circulated
widely within the supervisory community for information and for comment, and in
1979 it was decided to provide a forum for this wider group of supervisors to
meet and discuss the Committee's work and its conclusions to date. Accordingly,
an International Conference of Banking Supervisors was organized by the Bank of
England in London in July 1979. It was attended by bank supervisors from about
80 countries, representing Europe (Eastern and Western), North, Central and South
America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Pacific basin.
A variety of topics was discussed covering many of the principal areas of the
Committee's work up to that time, including the division of supervisory responsibility; co-operation between bank supervisors; capital and liquidity adequacy;
foreign exchange controls; consolidation; and the role of the offshore centres.
This was the first occasion ever on which supervisors worldwide had had an opportunity to meet together, to establish personal contacts, and to exchange views on
international aspects of banking supervision.
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The supervisory agencies in the U.S. have already announced that they will
be organizing a similar conference to be held in Washington in September 1981 and
we hope meetings of this kind may become a regular feature of the international
banking scene so that the work of the Committee of Supervisors meeting in Basle
may continue to be disseminated to the widest possible audience and the Committee
itself may profit from the ideas of those who do not take part in its regular
deliberations. Mention has already been made of the work of the Groupe de Contact
(some of whose members also sit on the Basle Committee). The studies of this
Group have frequently made a valuable contribution to the development of subjects
considered in the wider forum of the Basle Committee; for example, the concept of
consolidating banks' international business to make international supervision more
effective was first discussed in the Group. Other regional and more specialist
groupings of supervisors have also met from time to time and are being encouraged.
One example of these was a joint meeting of supervisors from the Group-10 countries
and the principal offshore centres which was held in Basle in October 1980. During this meeting a number of subjects were discussed, including exchanges of information, consolidation and supervisory standards, and procedures for consolidation and supervision--on all of which a community of approach and considerable
measure of agreement was achieved.
AREAS OF CO-OPERATIVE ACTION
I want to turn now to a somewhat more detailed description of the principal
areas of work to date in the Basle Committee.
A.

The Division of Supervisory Responsibility:

The Concordat

It is appropriate to begin with an outline of what has come to be known as
the Concordat on International Supervisory Co-operation. It sets out guidelines
covering the responsibilities of different supervisory authorities for the ongoing
dupervision of banks where those banks operate in more than one national jurisdiction. It is not, and was never intended to be, an agreement about responsibilities
for the provision of lender-of-last-resort facilities to the international banking
system; and there should not necessarily be considered to be any automatic link
between acceptance of responsibility for ongoing supervision and the assumption
of a lender-of-last-resort role. The aim of the Concordat is to sustain as far
as possible by effective supervision the health and safety of the existing structure. It does not set out to rule on the way in which the pieces of that structure should be picked up if it is broken. The Concordat encompasses the following
guidelines and recommendations:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the joint responsibility of host and parent authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each country
should ensure that foreign banking establishments are supervised, and supervision
should be adequate as judged by both host and parent authorities.
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host
authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to local
practices for their liquidity management and must comply with local regulations.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be essentially a
matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary
responsibility lies with the host authority, parent authorities should take
account of the exposure of their domestic banks' foreign subsidiaries and joint
ventures because of the parent banks' moral commitment in this regard.
(5) Practical co-operation would be facilitated by transfers of information
between host and parent authorities and by the granting of permission for inspections by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the host
authority. Every effort should be made to remove any legal restraints (particularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which
might hinder these forms of co-operation.

[2561

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

W.P. Cooke / Techniques for cooperation anongsuepen'isoir atthorities
To make the Conqordat fully effective internationally its principles will
have to be endorsed by supervisors worldwide. The London Conference in 1979
examined the terms of the Concordat and, although no formal decisions were taken,
there was general acceptance of its principles by those participating. The supervisors from the major offshore centres meeting in Basle in October 1980 also felt
able to endorse its principles. It should be stressed, though, that the Concordat's guidelines are not fully implemented in practice and certainly not in law,
and there remain areas where the division of responsibility is not entirely clear
cut and where banking secrecy provisions are to a degree an impediment to its
effectiveness.
Despite elements of imprecision--inevitable in agreements on principles
when responsibilities are shared--the Concordat nevertheless has become established as a most important cornerstone of international supervisory co-operation.
Its operation has recently been reviewed by the Committee who have concluded that
it is still soundly based and a valuable aid to international supervision.
B.

Consolidation

The second major plank, developed over the past three years, of the Basle
Committee's approach to international banking supervision is the principle that
banks' international business should be monitored on a consolidated basis.
The Committee made its first recommendation to the Governors on the merits
of supervision on a consolidated basis in 1978. The practice of consolidating
the totality of a bank's international business permits its capital adequacy and
risk exposure to be assessed on the basis of its worldwide business, including
that of its foreign branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates. This prevents banks
from "gearing up" imprudently on their capital or increasing their risk taking
beyond acceptable bounds through the establishment of operational presences in
foreign countries where the solvency and other prudential requirements might be
less tight than in the parent country. Consolidation in effect provides a clearer
picture of a bank's overall exposure to risk and enables parent supervisors to
apply their own standards to the monitoring of their banks' business irrespective
of where that business is conducted. Consequently it is an invaluable aid to
parent supervisors in enabling them to fulfill in practice their responsibilities
under the Concordat for the supervision of the solvency of their banks' foreign
affiliates.
The Governors have strongly endorsed the consolidation principle and recommended its early implementation. Since 1978, good progress has been made in
a number of countries to push ahead with the introduction or extention of supervision on a consolidated basis for their banks' international business, and others
have plans to do so. Banks in Canada, the Netherlands, and the U.S., for example,
have for several years been required to consolidate their foreign branches as well
as significant wholly-owned subsidiaries for supervisory purposes. Japanese banks
have been required to consolidate the accounts of their foreign branches for
several years and those of significant wholly-owned and majority-owned subsidiaries since 1978. In the United Kingdom new reporting arrangements were introduced
during the course of 1979 to cover the international risk exposure of all UK incorporated banks on a fully consolidated basis which should be fully effective
by the end of 1981. In December 1980 the Swiss authorities adopted the necessary
provisions to formalize the use of consolidated accounts for the purpose of assessing capital adequacy. In Germany the Gessler Commission's study of the German
banking system published in May 1979 recommended the consolidated approach to
supervision as a means of dealing with the problem of German banks abroad creating
so-called "credit pyramids", and legislation is currently in preparation. Further
impetus to the adoption of the principle of consolidation in other EEC countries
may come in the relatively near future from proposals for a Community directive,
recommended by the Advisory Committee at the end of last year, which would make
worldwide consolidation for supervisory purposes obligatory for EEC countries.
A recent review conducted by the Committee concluded that good progress was being
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made in applying the principle of consolidation but that much still remained to
be done especially in improving the availability and consistency of statistics.
C.

Solvency and Liquidity

Effective monitoring of banks' solvency and liquidity adequacy lies at the
heart of the national supervisory systems. Over recent years supervisors have
been concerned at the weakening of capital, or solvency, ratios that has occurred
in a number of countries, due in varying degrees to the rapid expansion of international business, a high degree of competition, the erosion of margins, and inflation constraining real profitability. This tendency has been accompanied and
reinforced by many banks' reluctance or inability to attract new equity capital
and their increasing use of subordinated debt as a substitute-a development
accepted rather reluctantly by supervisors.
In an international setting, the need to sustain an adequate solvency
profile for banks can be met through the application of the principle of consolidation to a bank's worldwide business without fundamental changes in approach
from that pursued at the national level. Up to now the Basle Committee in considering solvency questions has concentrated particularly on attacking the problem through improved consolidation arrangements.
Handling liquidity adequacy questions is more complicated because many
currencies are involved and there is no formalized lender-of-last-resort responsibility vested in any one body in international markets as there tends to be for
the domestic currency in a national market. The Committee has shared the concern
which has been voiced by some that the rapid increase in international lending
in the 1970's has been accompanied by a lengthening of maturities and an increased mismatch between banks' assets and liabilities. This gives rise to an
interest rate risk and a funding risk, and while in theory the rollover technique
should alleviate the first of those risks, banks may not match exactly to rollover
dates. In practice also some banks may not be able to re-fund their lending at
acceptable rates, particularly when interest rates are rising steeply.
Although there are differences of emphasis among its members, the Committee
considers that the degree of maturity transformation effected by banks in their
international business is a matter of especial importance to supervisors because
funding problems are not infrequently the origin of a problem bank situation.
More important, there is the risk that the increased interdependence of banks for
their liquidity managment could lead to domino effects throughout the international
banking system in the event of problems emerging in one corner of it.
Faced with an inadequacy of statistics in trying to assess the extent of
and variations in the mismatching being effected by banks in the conduct of their
international business, and in order to be able to make valid international comparisons, the Committee, at the request of the Group-lO Governors, began in 1978
to examine the construction of a uniform reporting system for the collection of
data on banks' maturity transformation in their international business. Following
extensive discussions, and with the Governors' support, it was agreed in September
1980 that a twice-yearly reporting system should be put in train under the aegis
of the BIS with the object of producing aggregated consolidated data on a consistent basis, with fairly detailed maturity breakdowns from sight to 7 years, covering all the international assets and liabilities of reporting banks. This operation began in March 1981. As with other international efforts of this kind, it
may take some time for the new system to become fully operational since some
countries may have substantially to amend or extend the basis on xwhich maturity
transformation data is currently reported; in others it will require a completely
new system. But despite such additional reporting burdens for the banks, which
for many countries, including the U.S., come on top of recent major revisions to
reporting requirements, it seemed to the Committee that it was a matter of considerable priority that better data on this very important aspect of international
banking activity should be made available and that these requests for information
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being made to the world's major banks were fully justified. In view of the
relatively untried and untested nature of market conventions with respect to
liquidity management and further recycling pressures which could well arise in
the future, supervisors need to be in a position to improve their capacity to
assess the maturity patterns and potential liquidity problems of their banks in
the international banking system as a whole.
D.

Country Risk

Much has been written about international banks' exposure to country risk.
A difficult concept to define with precision, country risk refers to the possibility that borrowers of a particular country may be unable or unwilling to fulfill their foreign obligations because of actions taken by that country's government to conserve foreign exchange reserves or for some other reason. This category of risk, which embraces both sovereign risk lending and lending to commercial
entities in foreign countries, has become of increasing concern to banks and
supervisory authorities because of the rapid expansion of international lending,
particularly to developing countries as part of the recycling process, to a
degree which at a time of adverse economic conditions worldwide could call into
question the ability of some borrowers to repay their loans as they fall due.
The Basle Committee has kept this subject under review over recent years. The
basic attitude of supervisors generally can be simply expressed: country risk,
as one form of credit risk, is a matter for the commercial judgment and decision
of each bank on a case-by-case basis. But as with all kinds of risk exposure in
banks' business the essential characteristic is that it should not be excessive
in relation to a bank's capacity to meet losses. The supervisors' particular
(1) to assist banks to assess the risks they are running by
concerns should be:
ensuring that the best possible data bearing on the lending decisions is available; (2) to ensure that the banks have adequate internal assessment and control
procedures; and (3) to improve prudential reporting and monitoring systems.
A number of steps have been taken over the last few years in line with this
approach. Following the Herstatt affair it became clear that an improved statistical breakdown of banks' exposure by country was needed. In 1977 the BIS began
to produce twice-yearly data on the maturity structure of the claims of banks in
the Group-10 area and certain other centres and in 1979 issued a comprehensive
manual on country indebtedness designed to direct the banks to statistical source
material for assessing country risk. Many countries' measurement and control
systems of this kind of exposure have been improved. For example, in 1978 the
main supervisory agencies in the U.S., which have done much pioneering work on
methods of country risk analysis, agreed on a common approach to the isolation of
country risk, including a checklist of factors to evaluate the banks' ability to
monitor and control their country risk. More recently the German and Belgian
authorities have asked auditors to include in their annual reports on banks an
evaluation of the banks' methods of country risk measurement and control. The
U.S. and the United Kingdom are now collecting country exposure information on a
consolidated basis. Other countries too are considering similar moves.
E .

Other Work

In addition to the work in these major subject areas the Committee has
examined a wide range of other issues of concern to supervisors of international
banking business. Each meeting gives members an opportunity to keep up-to-date
with recent developments in each other's rules and practices and to hear of problem situations and how they have been handled. Subjects that have been studied,
or on which recommendations have been made to the Governors, include broad comparisons of the supervisory systems in operation in each country and of various
aspects of the banks' own internal procedures to control foreign exchange operations, relations with brokers, official regulations, and the role of supervisors.
The Committee has also reviewed the various attitudes adopted by member countries
with regard to the role of loan capital in a bank's balance sheet, requirements
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for endowment capital for foreign branches, arrangements for bank audits, and
affiliation relationships between banks and non-banks. Other areas of study have
included the role of profit and loss analysis in bank supervision; techniques
of rescue and support; deposit protection arrangements in different countries;
the supervision of banks' trust business; and the prudential implications of certain aspects of loan syndication agreements. In addition, the Committee has been
involved with the accounting profession internationally and the International
Chamber of Commerce on technical work relevant to international banking business.
F.

Information Flows

The free flow of information across national borders between banks and
supervisors is a crucial feature of effective international co-operation between
supervisory authorities.
Bank secrecy laws or regulations in some countries can enjoin banks not
to reveal information about their customers and can preclude supervisors from
divulging to other supervisory authorities information that they have acquired
in the course of their duties. Obstacles to free cross-border flows of information between foreign offshoots and their parents and between host and parent
authorities, while their significance should not be overemphasized, raise a number of practical barriers to fully effective co-operation. First, foreign establishments may not be able to reveal information to their parent banks or the
parent bank may invoke the secrecy rules of the host country not to divulge information to its parent authority. Second, host authorities may be precluded by
local laws or practice on professional secrecy from revealing information about
the banks under their supervision to parent authorities. Third, differences in
the laws of professional secrecy applied to different supervisory authorities
could potentially make information less well protected in one country than in
another. Finally, parent authorities may be prevented from conducting on-the-spot
inspections to verify the information they receive.
Since such impediments can clearly impair parental supervision under the
Concordat, consolidated supervision, and co-operation in general, the Basle Committee is working to reduce these obstacles but believes that, at least amongst
its members, secrecy provisions do not in practice operate substantially to imt
pair supervisory co-operation. In particular, use of banks external auditors
may help alleviate some of these impediments. An important step forward in removing the legal barriers to exchanges of information between supervisors was
made in the First EEC Banking Directive, adopted at the end of 1979, which requires Member States to permit the exchange of information between supervisory
authorities about the management and ownership of credit institutions and data
necessary for monitoring their liquidity and solvency. More recently, there have
been signs of a greater willingness on the part of other countries to relax secrecy rules for purposes of international supervisory co-operation. These are encouraging developments in what must be recognized to be a gradual process, since
bank secrecy constraints are deeply rooted legal or customary attitudes in many
countries around the world and will not be quickly or easily removed.
Another area of concern in ensuring that effective exchanges of information
can take place is the consistency of the data. Differences of style and techniques
and of intensity of supervision lead to considerable variations in the amount and
form of the information required by national supervisory authorities. Much of the
information supplied by the banks is designed to meet not only prudential but also
monetary and statistical purposes for which information needs differ widely between countries. Phat is more, during the last few years, as a result of the
rapid change in banking and supervisory arrangements in the 1970s, many countries
gave considerably amended and generally enhanced their national reporting systems.
This has placed burdens on banks and the authorities have to strike a sensible
balance between securing important informational objectives and making excessive
demands on their banks.
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A start has been made on "international" reporting with the collection of
reasonably consistent data on country exposure and maturity transformation. As
these reporting systems are improved and consolidation reveals what further coordination is necessary on a broader front, it may be hoped that models will
evolve on which future changes in national systems can be based. In the meantime,
at this experimental stage in the collection of "international" data, the banks-and supervisors-will have to recognize that some duplication of existing systems
and allocation of extra resources are inevitable but that these should be borne
with for the general good. Over time the Committee will be working to achieve a
greater degree of agreement about the purposes which data should serve so that
all countries will have a better basis for considering sympathetically the desirability of standardizing systems for the production of such data.
CONCLUSION
The initial moves toward international co-operation in banking supervision
in the mid-1970s arose out of problems associated with the rapid growth of the
Euro-markets and the strains of international recycling following the first major
oil price rise. As the 1980s began, in the light of the continued growth in international business and pressures from further oil price rises, the Central Bank
Governors of the Group-lO countries and Switzerland took a further close look at
international financial markets and banking activity. They concluded that high
priority should be given to the maintenance of the soundness and stability of the
international banking system.
To enhance the authorities' surveillance capacity the Standing Committee
on Euro-markets was charged with the regular review of international banking
statistics and other relevant information. Thus developments in the macro-economic field, which profoundly affect the environment within which supervisors operate in working to sustain the soundness of individual banks, are now being regularly monitored. At the same time, in their communique of April 1980, the
Governors referring to the risks run by individual banks re-affirmed "the cardinal
importance which they attach to the maintenance of sound banking standards-particularly with regard to capital adequacy, liquidity and concentration of risks.
To this end they place high priority on bringing into full effect the initiatives
already begun by the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices
with regard to the supervision of banks' international business on a consolidated
basis, improved assessment of country risk exposure, and the development of more
comprehensive and consistent data for monitoring the extent of banks' maturity
transformation." Thus, some at least of the tasks of the international supervisory community in the early 1980s have been signposted.
The last few years have seen the emergence of a strong sense of community
of interest among those responsible for supervising the international business of
banks in full awareness that the health and safety of individual banks now depend
on the soundness of the whole international banking system. The knowledge that
this co-operation exists provides reassurance to the markets that the international
banking system is being effectively supervised and that, should problems emerge,
contacts and understandings exist and experience can be shared to ensure that
speedy solutions can be found to minimize the extent of any disturbance to the
system.
The Basle Committee, and the Contact Group, have played a pivotal role in
this process. They have provided a forum for mutual education about each other's
systems; for the exchange of confidential information within the bounds of each
country's secrecy rules; for the study of individual problems to learn the lessons
they contain for supervisors; for the elaboration of guidelines that should govern
the supervision of banks' international business; and perhaps most important of
all, for the establishment of personal contacts which has led to practical continuing collaboration outside the confines of the committees in an atmosphere of
mutual confidence and trust both in routine matters and in individual problem cases.
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The result of these contacts and exchanges has been to create a new international approach to banking supervision. The foundations of international cooperation in supervisory responsibilities have been laid, notably in the Concordat and the recommendations on consolidation. In addition, new international
guidelines, frequently incorporating the best of individual countries' experience
and developed through international discussion, often in a spirit of real compromise, are coming to be widely accepted by authorities worldwide and are increasingly being reflected in the legislative and administrative measures undertaken
by individual countries.
Moreover, in framing new policies many countries increasingly seek possible
models in the methods of other countries, and this is creating a slow but perceptible trend towards convergence of supervisory techniques based on best practice.
More-remains to be done in the 1980s but a basic international framework for
future co-ordination and co-operation, both amons the major industrialized countries and more widely, has already been established.
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